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INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE 
 This brief is filed on behalf of the undersigned 
Law Professors identified in Appendix A.1  
 Amici are scholars at U.S. law schools whose 
research and teaching focus is intellectual property 
law, federal Indian law and constitutional law. Amici 
have no direct interest in the outcome of this litiga-
tion. Amici are concerned that the Court of Appeals 
decision below is inconsistent with the well settled 
law that laches does not apply to trademark cancella-
tion claims, including those based on disparagement, 
because of the strong public interest in being free from 
the harms that disparagement causes. These harms, 
which include damaging stereotyping and stigmatiza-
tion, are serious and deserve protection no matter 
what private harm may be caused by delay to the 
trademark registrant. Further, precluding laches in 
these cases protects the government’s interest in as-
suring the integrity of the Trademark Register. Amici 
urge this Court to grant review of this matter to 
clarify that laches cannot apply to a disparagement 
cancellation claim. Such a ruling will increase cer-
tainty for trademark holders, individuals and groups 
 
 1 The parties were timely notified of the intent to file this 
amicus brief pursuant to Rule 37.2. Letters of the parties’ 
general consent to file are on file with the Court. This brief was 
not authored in whole or in part by counsel for any party. No one 
other than Amici and their counsel made a monetary contribution 
to preparing or submitting this brief. Amici’s institutional affili-
ations are provided only for purposes of identification. 
2 
claiming or subject to disparagement, and promote 
the larger public interest inherent in these claims. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 Disparagement claims belong in the category of 
trademark cancellation claims that are not subject to 
laches defenses because the harm to the public in the 
continued registration of the mark outweighs any pri-
vate harm that may be caused by the delay. This ex-
ception categorically precludes application of the 
laches defense and does not require a balancing of the 
equities that occurs in ordinary cases involving a 
laches defense. Courts have recognized that the equi-
table defense is inapplicable in disputes in which 
there is a public harm caused by the continued regis-
tration and enforcement of the mark.   
 Disparagement claims explicitly target the public 
harms of perpetuating offensive stereotypes. If laches 
defenses are barred in cancellation claims that only 
implicitly protect the public, then that doctrine clear-
ly extends to cancellation claims that explicitly pro-
tect the public from harm. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Disparagement Claims Are Not Subject to 
Laches Defenses 
 Disparagement claims belong in the category of 
trademark cancellation claims that are not subject to 
laches defenses because the harm to the public in the 
continued registration of the mark outweighs any 
private harm that may be caused by the delay. It is 
settled law that laches, even if proven, will not defeat 
numerous cancellation claims. 3 Thomas J. McCarthy, 
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
§ 20:77 (4th ed. 2009); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. 
Corp. v. Am. Meter Co., 153 U.S.P.Q. 419 (T.T.A.B. 1967) 
(“The equitable principles of laches and estoppel are 
inapplicable where the registration of a descriptive 
term is involved.”); Philip Morris Inc. v. He-Man 
Prods., Inc., 157 U.S.P.Q. 200 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (“[I]t is 
a well established principle of trademark law that the 
equitable defense of laches and estoppel is not avail-
able in a proceeding wherein, as here, the adverse 
party is claiming that the designation in question 
inherently cannot function as a trademark for the 
goods in question under the trademark statute.”); 
Am. Velcro, Inc. v. Charles Mayer Studios, Inc., 177 
U.S.P.Q. 149 (T.T.A.B. 1973) (“While this testimony 
might well conjure up the equitable defense of 
estoppel and laches, it may be appropriate to point 
out that these equitable defenses are not available to 
a defendant in a proceeding wherein, as here, the 
adverse party is claiming in essence that the mark in 
question inherently cannot function as a trademark 
4 
under the statute . . . The rationale behind these 
series of cases is that it is within the public interest 
to have registrations which are void ab initio striken 
from the register and that this interest or concern 
cannot be voided by the inaction of any single person 
or concern, no matter how long the delay persists.”); 
Saint-Gobain Abrasives, Inc. v. Unova Indus. Auto-
mation Sys., Inc., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 1355, 1359 (T.T.A.B. 
2003) (“It is well-established that the equitable 
defenses of laches and acquiescence are not available 
against claims of genericness, descriptiveness, fraud 
and abandonment. . . . For the same reason, we hold 
that where the proposed ground for opposition and 
cancellation is functionality, the defenses of laches 
and acquiescence are unavailable.”); Midwest Plastic 
Fabricators, Inc. v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 5 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1067, 1069 (T.T.A.B. 1987) (“[T]he defense 
of laches is not available where the petition to cancel 
is based on a claim that a respondent has failed to 
control the use of a certification mark, such that the 
mark is being used to certify goods that do not 
meet specified standards. . . . The public interest in 
certification marks and the assurance that registered 
certification marks are being properly controlled 
outweighs any possible injury to the respondent 
resulting from inaction by petitioner.”). As this 
doctrine has developed in the courts, these claims 
include: 1) the claim of inevitable confusion;2 2) the 
 
 2 See Chun King Corp. v. Genii Plant Line, Inc., 403 F.2d 
274, 276 (C.C.P.A. 1968); Ultra-White Co. v. Johnson Chem. 
(Continued on following page) 
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claim that the mark is generic;3 3) the claim that the 
registration was fraudulently obtained;4 4) the claim 
that the mark has been abandoned;5 5) the claim that 
the mark is functional;6 and 6) the claim of lack of 
control over a certification mark.7 In each of the 
cancellation claims to which this doctrine applies, any 
injury to the registrant caused by the petitioner’s 
delay in bringing the claim would be outweighed by 
the anticipated injury to the public caused by the 
continued registration of the mark.  
 These exceptions go beyond the ordinary balancing 
of the equities that occurs in any case involving a laches 
defense to categorically preclude application of the 
doctrine. In cases in which these cancellation claims 
 
Indus., Inc., 465 F.2d 891, 893-94 (C.C.P.A. 1972); Richdel, Inc. 
v. Mathews Co., 190 U.S.P.Q. 37, 41 (T.T.A.B. 1976). 
 3 See Steinberg Bros., Inc. v. J. P. Stevens & Co., 156 
U.S.P.Q. 574, 579-80 (T.T.A.B. 1967); Am. Velcro, Inc. v. Charles 
Mayer Studios, Inc., 177 U.S.P.Q. 149, 156 (T.T.A.B. 1973); W.D. 
Byron & Sons, Inc. v. Stein Bros. Mfg. Co., 146 U.S.P.Q. 313, 316 
(T.T.A.B. 1965). 
 4 See Treadwell’s Drifters, Inc. v. Marshak, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1318 (T.T.A.B. 1990). 
 5 See Linville v. Rivard, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1731, n.5 (T.T.A.B. 
1997), aff ’d on other grounds, 133 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 
Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 213 F. Supp. 2d 
247, 266-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 6 See Saint-Gobain Abrasives, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1359. 
 7 See Midwest Plastic Fabricators, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1069 
(“The defense of laches is not available where the petition to 
cancel is based on a claim that a respondent has failed to control 
the use of a certification mark.”). 
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are made, courts do not wade into an evaluation of 
the public harm versus the private harm in the 
application of a laches defense. Because of the nature 
of the cancellation claim, the public harm will nec-
essarily outweigh the private harm and laches cannot 
therefore be asserted. 
 The interest of the public in being protected 
against the registration of marks that would cause it 
injury must forestall the application of this equitable 
defense. Courts have recognized that the equitable 
defense is inappropriate in disputes in which there is 
a public harm in addition to the private injuries 
asserted by the parties. Thus, in cases involving 
marks that cause inevitable confusion in the 
marketplace and certification marks that no longer 
accurately certify a characteristic about a good or 
service, not only would the private claimants be 
injured, but the public would also be harmed by the 
misleading information caused by the registered 
mark. Likewise, in the cases of generic, functional, 
abandoned and fraudulently obtained marks, not only 
would the private claimants be injured, but the public 
would also be injured by the barrier to competition 
caused by the registered mark. Thus a number of 
cancellation claims covered by this doctrine protect 
the public by protecting consumers or by protecting 
competition.  
 In this way, in each of the cancellation claims 
where laches has been found not to apply, the courts 
have identified a harm to the public that is in 
addition to the harm to the private party that would 
7 
likely be caused by the continued registration of the 
mark. In these cases, courts have held that the 
equitable defense of laches was inapplicable due to 
the additional presence of the public harm.8 The doc-
trine that emerges from these cases is that laches is 
not available as a defense where there is a significant 
public harm likely to result from the continued 
registration of the mark. 
 If this exception to laches is to be maintained on 
the basis of public harm, then cancellation claims of 
disparagement must be brought within it. The 
protection from disparaging marks is aimed prin-
cipally at the public. In disparagement cancellation 
proceedings, the public is not an additional bene-
ficiary of the claim brought as a result of private 
motivations, as is the case in the other claims that 
have been held to preclude a laches defense.9 Instead, 
 
 8 See Chun King Corp. v. Genii Plant Line, Inc., 403 F.2d at 
276; Ultra-White Co. v. Johnson Chem. Indus., Inc., 465 F.2d at 
893-94; Richdel, Inc. v. Mathews Co., 190 U.S.P.Q. at 41; Stein-
berg Bros., Inc. v. J. P. Stevens & Co., 156 U.S.P.Q. at 579-80; 
Am. Velcro, Inc. v. Charles Mayer Studios, Inc., 177 U.S.P.Q. at 
156; W.D. Byron & Sons, Inc. v. Stein Bros. Mfg. Co., 146 
U.S.P.Q. at 316; Treadwell’s Drifters, Inc. v. Marshak, 18 
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1318; Linville v. Rivard, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at n.5; 
Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 213 F. Supp. 2d at 
266-67; Saint-Gobain Abrasives, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1359; Midwest 
Plastic Fabricators, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1069. 
 9 In only three disparagement cases was a private harm 
even present. See Doughboy Indus., Inc. v. The Reese Chem. Co., 
88 U.S.P.Q. 227, 228 (1951) (holding the mark “Doughboy” when 
used on prophylactic preparations for the prevention of venereal 
disease may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with 
(Continued on following page) 
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in disparagement claims, the first and only objective 
is to protect the public from harm.10 Unlike the 
cancellation claims in which the courts analyzed and 
articulated an additional public harm beyond the 
private harm, in disparagement claims the public 
harm is the only harm contemplated. Thus dispar-
agement claims are the archetypical public interest 
claims. If laches defenses are barred in cancellation 
claims that implicitly protect the public, then that 
doctrine clearly extends to cancellation claims that 
explicitly protect the public. 
 
American WWI soldiers); Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc., 
6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635, 1639-41 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (finding the appli-
cant’s defecating dog mark to be disparaging because the mark 
would be considered generally offensive by a substantial portion 
of the public and would be recognized by the public as referring 
to the Greyhound Corp.); Boston Red Sox Baseball Club Ltd. 
P’ship v. Brad Francis Sherman, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 67, 22-29 
(T.T.A.B. 2008) (finding the applicant’s SEX ROD mark to be 
disparaging because the mark would be perceived by a sub-
stantial composite of the public as vulgar and the public would 
associate the offensive mark with the Boston Red Sox). In each 
of these cases, a mark owner stood in to vindicate the public’s 
right. Significantly, these cases were brought under a claim of 
disparagement, in which the public’s sensibilities are at stake, 
and not a claim of dilution by tarnishment, in which only the 
mark owner’s sensibilities are relevant. 
 10 See Bromberg, et al. v. Carmel Self Serv., Inc., 198 
U.S.P.Q. 176, 179 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (In finding that two female 
opposers had standing to challenge the applicant’s “ONLY A 
BREAST IN THE MOUTH IS BETTER THAN A LEG IN THE 
HAND” mark on behalf of the female segment of the public, the 
T.T.A.B. stated: “In the past, marks have been refused 
registration by the examiner [under § 2(a)] on the ground that 
they were offensive to a certain segment of the public.”). 
9 
 Unlike cancellation claims of confusion, fraud, 
abandonment, functionality, and genericism, which 
occur with great frequency before the courts,11 dispar-
agement claims are rare.12 Only a few disparagement 
claims have been litigated outside of the Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board,13 and half have been ex parte 
proceedings in which the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office asserts the prohibition on behalf of 
the public.14 Due to the dearth of disparagement cases 
generally, it is not surprising that no court has yet 
  
 
 11 See 6 McCarthy on Trademarks § 31:60 (noting that 
defendants in many trademark infringement suits pursue 
claims of fraud); 3 McCarthy on Trademarks § 17:4 (explaining 
that abandonment claims are significant in a number of legal 
situations). 
 12 Only fourteen disparagement cases have been decided on 
their merits. See In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q. 
1216, 1221 n.4 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (noting existence of “little pre-
cedent on the meaning of ‘disparage’ in Section 2(a)”); 3 McCarthy 
on Trademarks § 19:77.1 (“There is very little case law on what 
constitutes a mark that disparage[s] a racial or ethnic group.”). 
 13 See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 
2009); Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 
McDermott v. San Francisco Women’s Motorcycle Contingent, 240 
Fed. Appx. 865 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 14 See, e.g., In re Anti-Communist World Freedom Cong., 
Inc., 161 U.S.P.Q. 304 (T.T.A.B. 1969); In re Condas, S.A., 188 
U.S.P.Q. 544 (T.T.A.B. 1975); In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1653 (T.T.A.B. 1990); In re Hines, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1685 
(T.T.A.B. 1994); In re Squaw Valley Dev. Co., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1264 
(T.T.A.B. 2006); In re Heeb Media, LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071 
(T.T.A.B. 2008). 
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held that the laches defense is inapplicable in can-
cellation petitions involving disparagement claims.15 
The absence of precedent in no way undermines the 
consistent application of the rule that laches does not 
apply in cases involving public harms. 
 Not every case in which an argument can be 
made that the public has an interest should be 
included in this doctrine. Obviously the exception 
would swallow the rule were courts to extend the 
doctrine every time a claimant argued that they were 
standing in on behalf of the public’s interest in an 
efficient marketplace. In addition to the cancellation 
claims set out above that have already been ruled to 
be within this exception, the only other cancellation 
claims that ought to be included are those that are 
explicitly oriented to protecting the public. 
  
 
 15 Cancellation claims that marks are either scandalous or 
immoral are also rarely litigated claims that should not be 
subject to laches defenses because of the public’s interest in 
prohibiting such marks. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). No court has yet 
been asked to apply a laches defense to such a claim. Unlike 
claims of disparagement, immorality and scandalousness, which 
are all aimed at protecting the public, a claim that a mark 
falsely causes a connection may address a private or public 
harm depending on whether the false connection is made to an 
individual or to a group. See In re White, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1645 
(T.T.A.B. 2006) (refusing registration of MOHAWK for cigarettes 
because it would falsely suggest a connection with the St. Regis 
Band of Mohawk Indians of New York). 
11 
 Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act contains a number 
of claims that may be asserted in a cancellation pro-
ceeding. All of the claims assert paramount public 
interests that should preclude application of laches to 
the claims. Among other things, this section prohibits 
the registration of a mark that “consists of or comprises 
immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter 
which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection 
with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or 
national symbols, or bring them into contempt or 
disrepute. . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). Each of these 
claims addresses the public’s interest and should be 
immune to laches defenses. 
 
II. Disparaging Marks Harm the Public 
 Protection against trademark disparagement has 
been understood in various ways to prevent harm to 
the public. The relevant concerns include protection 
of a privacy interest, as in “the right to be ‘let alone’ 
from contempt and ridicule,”16 and the belief that 
“group libel” is an actionable harm. See generally 
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). At its 
core, the prohibition against registration of dispar-
aging marks protects against the perpetuation of of-
fensive stereotypes about a particular group. See In re 
Hines, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1691 (holding that applicant’s 
depiction of Buddha dressed in a bathing suit 
 
 16 See Greyhound Corp., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1639 (citing Carson 
v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 
1983)). 
12 
sprawled across loungewear “slights, depreciates and 
cheapens Buddha and Buddhism”); In re Heeb Media, 
LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1073, 1077 (explaining that the 
term “Heeb” is a derogatory term for a person of 
Jewish descent and cannot be registered as a trade-
mark because it offends a substantial composite of the 
relevant group).  
 Although the legislative history of the enactment 
of the disparagement claim under Section 2(a) of the 
Lanham Act is scant, the present U.S. prohibition on 
the registration of marks that harm the public 
derives from the first major multilateral trademark 
treaty in force in the late nineteenth century. The 
authoritative Paris Convention in its first iteration in 
1883 provided only one acceptable ground for the 
refusal of trademark registrations, which was when a 
mark was considered contrary to morality or public 
order.17 A mark contrary to public order has been 
defined as one that is contrary to basic legal or social 
concepts.18 Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act mirrors 
and implements the concern for morality and public 
 
 17 “[T]he only ground for refusal or invalidation of the 
registration of trademarks covered by Article 6,” which set forth 
the conditions of registration and the independence of regis-
tration of the same mark in different countries, was if “the object 
for which it is requested is considered contrary to morality or 
public order.” See G.H.C. Bodenhausen, Guide to the Application 
of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
114 (1968) (citing Actes de Paris, I. pp.73-74, 138). 
 18 See id., at 116 (listing examples including a mark con-
taining a religious symbol, the emblem of a forbidden political 
party, or the emblem of a public body). 
13 
order in the Paris Convention,19 as it refuses to 
permit or maintain the registration of marks that are 
“immoral, deceptive, or scandalous” or which “may 
disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, 
beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into 
contempt or disrepute.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).  
 While trademark law most often measures eco-
nomic harms, the underlying notion in these cate-
gories of prohibited marks is to protect against the 
perpetuation of unflattering stereotypes about a 
particular group and the harms to both its members 
and the public at large. As the T.T.A.B. found in this 
case below, “there exists a broader interest – an 
interest beyond the personal interest being asserted 
by the present petitioners – in preventing a party 
from receiving the benefits of registration where a 
trial might show that respondent’s marks hold a 
substantial segment of the population up to public 
ridicule.”20 While the injury to the members of the 
group is self-evident, the social costs to the public at 
large may include reinforcing hateful and erroneous 
stereotypes and misinformation about a certain group. 
The harm is at once to the referenced group and also to 
 
 19 The United States is a signatory to the Paris Convention. 
See Jasmine Abdel-khalik, To Live in In-“fame”-y: Reconceiving 
Scandalous Marks as Analogous to Famous Marks, 25 Cardozo 
Arts & Ent. L.J. 173, 186 (2007) (noting that Congress examined 
foreign trademark laws before passing the 1905 Act and suggesting 
Congress was significantly influenced by international registration 
regimes).  
 20 Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828, 1830 
(T.T.A.B. 1994). 
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society as a whole. See In re Heeb Media, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 
at 1074. 
 The effects of trademarks are not limited to their 
role to “identify and distinguish” goods or services, 
but importantly they have unique power to shape, 
reflect, and comment upon social identities.21 In this 
way, disparaging marks, with their power to stigma-
tize a group or individual, pose a serious threat to the 
larger common good for both stigmatized groups  
and society as a whole. The term “stigma” itself refers 
to a mark placed on an individual to signify infamy or 
disgrace.22 Those associated with stigmas are not 
viewed as normal, but different, flawed, or unde-
sirable.23 The public as a whole suffers from stigma-
tizing individuals or groups, as the public typically 
constructs a false ideology to explain the stigmatized 
group’s inferiority and rationalize society’s animos- 
ity toward it.24 Studies demonstrate that “bias can 
be exacerbated or mitigated by the information 
environments we inhabit,” and that “consuming nega-
tive images can exacerbate implicit bias.”25  
 
 21 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: 
Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 397, 397 (1990). 
 22 James Flynn et al., Risk, Media, and Stigma 3 (2001). 
 23 See id., at 14. 
 24 Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of 
Spoiled Identity 5-6 (1986). 
 25 Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 Harv. L.Rev. 1490, 
1557, 1561 (2005). 
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III. Disparaging Marks Harm the Govern-
ment’s Interest in Protecting the Integrity 
of the Register of Trademarks 
 The prohibition on registering and maintaining 
disparaging marks also has been found to further the 
government’s interest in protecting the integrity of 
the Register of Trademarks. Courts are mindful that 
trademark registration confers distinct legal advan-
tages over common-law marks, including “prima facie 
evidence” of validity in subsequent cancellation 
proceedings.26 To protect the public from confusion 
over the source of goods, it is crucial to determine the 
validity of trademarks listed on the Federal Register 
to ensure that these benefits are not granted improp-
erly.27 Moreover, the federal government should not 
waste its valuable resources on protecting invalid 
marks.28 The government should also not provide 
its imprimatur through federal registration of marks 
that are void ab initio, such as those found to be 
 
 26 3 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §19:9. 
 27 In evaluating the validity of a disputed trademark, courts 
must consider that the “interests [of the public] are paramount” 
in this calculus. 1 McCarthy on Trademarks § 2:33 n.5 (citing 
James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 
274 (7th Cir. 1976)). See Nestle Co., Inc. v. Chester’s Market, Inc., 
596 F. Supp. 1445, 1454 (D. Conn. 1984) (explaining that “pro-
tection of the public is a primary goal” of the regulatory frame-
work). 
 28 See Dwinell-Wright Co. v. Nat’l Fruit Product Co., Inc., 
129 F.2d 848, 853 (1st Cir. 1942) (explaining that there is a 
“waste and duplication of effort” associated with repeated liti-
gation over the same issue.). 
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disparaging.29 This is particularly true here where the 
government has an interest in preventing its instru-
mentalities from being used to perpetuate and enforce 
offensive stereotypes.30 Safeguarding the integrity of 
the Trademark Register is an important public policy 
goal that has been vindicated in judicial decisions 
along with the injury to parties challenging a 
registered trademark.31  
--------------------------------- ♦ ---------------------------------  
 
 29 See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1981) 
(“We do not see . . . [the refusal to register such marks] as an 
attempt to legislate morality, but, rather, a judgment by the 
Congress that such marks not occupy the time, services, and use 
of funds of the federal government.”).  
 30 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (“[w]hen the 
effect of . . . [government] action is to deny rights subject to the 
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is the obligation of 
this Court to enforce the constitutional commands.”). 
 31 Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 194 (3d Cir. 2001); 
(“[T]he interest vindicated by Section 14 is not just the injury to 
the challenging party, but the integrity of the register.”); Harjo, 
30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1831 (“The Board has held that the equitable 
defenses of laches and estoppel are not available against claims 
of fraud and abandonment because there exists a broader in-
terest – a ‘public policy’ interest – in addition to a private in-
terest in removing from the register those registrations procured 
or maintained by fraud and those registrations for marks that 
have been abandoned.”); TBC Corp. v. Grand Prix Ltd., 12 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1311, 1313 (T.T.A.B. 1989) (“Where the proposed 
ground for cancellation is abandonment, equitable defenses 
should be unavailable for the same reason they have been held 
unavailable when the ground asserted is descriptiveness or 
fraud. It is in the public interest to remove abandoned regis-
trations from the register.”). 
17 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, this Court should 
grant review of this matter to clarify that the doctrine 
of laches is inapplicable to trademark cancellation 
petitions where there is a public harm caused by 
continued registration of the mark. 
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